The key players in WorldCom's bookkeeping misrepresentation included CFO Scott Sullivan, the General Accounting and Internal Audit offices, outside evaluator Arthur Andersen, and the governing body. The case gives adequate subtle element to permit to a full dialog of the weights that lead officials and administrators to "cook the books," the limit between income smoothing or administration and false reporting, the part for inside control frameworks and interior review to forestall or quickly distinguish bookkeeping extortion, the assumptions about administration procedures performed by outer examiners and the governing body, and the weight and outcomes when center supervisors take after requests that they know aren't right. Composed from people in general record, the case contains various quotes from an individual included in the WorldCom extortion that were accounted for by the Investigative Committee and Wall Street Journal articles around a few of the people got up to speed in the circumstance.
1. Why were the actions taken by WorldCom managers not detected earlier?
2. What processes or systems should be in place to prevent or detect quickly the types of actions that occurred in WorldCom?
3. Were the external auditors and board of directors blameworthy in this case? Why or why not?